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The Pour-Over Trust
Elliott H. Kajan*
O NE OF THE MOST important features of the inter vivos trust
is its function as the receptacle of a pour-over provision
in a will. The pour-over device is utilized when a disposition by
a will provides, often in the residuary clause, for the devise or
bequest of additional property to a previously created inter vivos
trust.1 This avoids the necessity of repeating in the will all the
terms of the trust, and the estate conveyed to the trust is not
thereafter involved in probate proceedings. 2 The grantor of an
amendable inter vivos trust can thus create and remodel an estate
plan without relinquishing any control over the assets during his
lifetime.
3
Accompanying the benefits, however, are a myriad of legal
problems. Over the past twenty years the pour-over provision
has become the subject of troubled controversy and conflicting
judicial opinion.4 The problem is clearly manifested by Vice-
Chancellor Parker, who stated,
A testator cannot by his will prospectively create for him-
self a power to dispose of his property by an instrument not
duly executed as a will or codicil.5
The difficulty is encountered when the trust is amendable or
revocable or both and the testator, after executing his will with
* B.S. in Bus. Adm., Ohio State University; Internal Revenue Agent, In-
ternal Revenue Service; Fourth-Year student at Cleveland-Marshall Law
School of Baldwin-Wallace College.
1 Prock, Devises or Bequests to Trustees-Pour-Over From a Will to Inter-
vivos Trust, 13 Baylor L. Rev. 301 (1961). See good definition in Restate-
ment (Second), Trusts § 54 comment f (1959).
2 See Prefatory Note to Uniform Testamentary Additions to Trusts Act,
drafted by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws and approved by that Conference in Aug., 1960 and approved by Am.
Bar Asso. at its Sept., 1960 meeting.
3 Shattuck & Farr, An Estate Planner's Handbook 85 (2d ed. 1953). Heyert
and Rachlin, Pourover Trusts: Consequences of Applying the Doctrines of
Incorporation by Reference and Fact of Independent Significance, 34 N. Y. U.
L. Rev. 1106 (1959).
4 See Scott, Trusts and the Statute of Wills, 43 Harv. L. Rev. 521 (1930);
Palmer, Testamentary Dispositions to the Trustee of an Intervivos Trust, 50
Mich. L. Rev. 33 (1951); Lauritzen, Can a Revocable Trust be Incorporated
by Reference?, 45 Ill. L. Rev. 583 (1950); McClanahan, Bequests to an Ex-
isting Trust-Problems and Suggested Remedies, 47 Calif. L. Rev. 267(1959) ; Prock, op. cit. supra n. 1; Heyert and Rachlin, op. cit. supra n. 3.
5 Johnson v. Ball, 5 De G & S 85, 64 Eng. Rep. 1029 (1851); noted in 21
A. L. R. 2d 220, 226 (1952).
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the pour-over provision, amends or partially revokes the inter
vivos trust but does not alter the will.6 Where the inter vivos
trust is amended subsequent to the execution of the will the
question arises as to how the testamentary disposition is affected,
i.e., is it modified, or does it follow the original terms of the liv-
ing trust, or does it fail altogether? 7
The devolution of a person's assets is controlled by local
legislation and the right to alter such disposition by will is strict-
ly statutory.8 A person may dispose of his property during his
lifetime by either deed or gift, but only by the use of a will is
he able to direct its disposition at death.9
The objection to the pour-over provision attempting to dis-
pose of the estate corpus under trust provisions foreign to the
will and not executed in pursuance of the statute of wills10 has
been partially defeated by the courts through the use of the doc-
trines of Incorporation by Reference and Independent Signifi-
cance." Any remaining doubt as to the validity of a pour-over
into an amended inter vivos trust created by the testator has
been almost entirely eliminated by passage of state legislation.
1 2
Doctrine of Incorporation by Reference
The doctrine of Incorporation by Reference13 dates back to the
old rule of English Law of Wills.' 4 The principle stated by Jus-
tice Wilson was that
6 In 1 Scott, Trusts Sec. 54.3 (2d ed. 1956), Prof. Scott states there is no
problem "where the inter vivos trust is amended by instruments which
comply with the formalities required for the execution of wills .... and
that the property disposed of by the will should pass in accordance with
the terms of the inter vivos trust as amended." See Roth, Estate Planning in
Florida: The Revocable Inter Vivos Trust, 16 U. Fla. L. Rev. 34 (1963).
7 1 Scott, id.
8 In Re Andrus' Will, 156 Misc. 268, 281 N. Y. Supp. 831 (1935); Atkinson,
Wills Sec. 4 (2d ed. 1953); 1 Bowe-Parker: Page on Wills Sec. 3 (1960).
9 Trustees etc. v. Hall, 48 Ill. App. 536 (1892); Ransom v. Pottawattamie
County, 168 Iowa 570, 150 N. W. 657 (1915); Ates v. Ates, 189 Miss. 226, 196
So. 243 (1940); Atchison v. Atchison, 198 Okla. 98, 175 P. 2d 309 (1946); see
also Lauritzen, op. cit. supra n. 4.
10 Hatheway v. Smith, 79 Conn. 506, 65 Atl. 1058 (1907); Atwood v. Rhode
Island Hospital Trust Co., 275 Fed. 513 (1st Cir. 1921).
11 Where the inter vivos trust is irrevocable and not subject to modifica-
tion see Restatement (Second), Trusts § 54 comment g (1959); if rev-
ocable and modifiable but it is not revoked or modified see Restatement
(Second), Trusts § 54 comment h (1959). Also see Roth, op. cit. supra n. 6.
12 For a detailed compilation of state statutes see infra n. 66.
13 Exhaustive discussions may be found in Evans, Incorporation by Ref-
(Continued on next page)
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If a testator in his will refers expressly to any paper already
written, and has so described it that there can be no doubt
of the identity, and the will is executed in the presence of
three witnesses, that paper, whether executed or not, makes
part of the will; and such reference is the same as if he had
incorporated it.' 5
It is the trust instrument which is incorporated into the will, not
the trust.16
Certain prerequisites must be met before the inter vivos
trust is incorporated by reference into the will. The reference
in the pour-over provision must be to a written trust instru-
ment. 17 The trust instrument must be referred to in the will and
must be in existence at the time of execution of the will.' 8 It
must be established from the language of the will that the testa-
tor intends to incorporate the extrinsic inter vivos trust. 9
The greatest conflict of judicial opinion in the applicability
of the doctrine of incorporation by reference arises when an
(Continued from preceding page)
erence, Integration, and Non-Testamentary Act, 25 Col. L. Rev. 879 (1925);
Evans, Nontestamentary Acts and Incorporation by Reference, 16 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 635 (1949); Lauritzen, Can a Revocable Trust be Incorporated by Ref-
erence?, 45 Ill. L. Rev. 583 (1950); Lauritzen, Pour Over Wills, 95 Trusts &
Estates 992 (1956); Comment, 27 Miss. L. J. 220 (1956); Atkinson, Wills Sec.
80 (2d ed. 1953); 1 Scott, Trusts § 54.1 (2d ed. 1956); 1 Bogert, Trusts and
Trustees § 106 (2d ed. 1951); 2 Bowe-Parker: Page on Wills § 19.17 (1960).
14 Earliest case was Molineux v. Molineux, 4 Cro. Jac. 144, 79 Eng. Rep. 126
(1607), cited by Lauritzen, op. cit. supra n. 4.
15 Habergham v. Vincent, 2 Ves. Jr. 204, 30 Eng. Rep. 595 (1793); noted in
144 A. L. R. 714 (1943).
16 1 Scott, op. cit. supra n. 6 at 367; Montgomery v. Blankenship, 217 Ark.
357, 230 S. W. 2d 51 (1950).
17 Wilcox v. Atty. Gen. 207 Mass. 198, 93 N. E. 599 (1911); 144 A. L. R. 714
(1943).
18 Kinnear v. Langley, 209 Ark. 878, 192 S. W. 2d 978 (1946); Simor v. Gray-
son, 15 Cal. 2d 531, 102 P. 2d 1081 (1940); Appeal of Bryan, 77 Conn. 240, 58
Atl. 748 (1904); In Re Cameron's Estate, 215 Iowa 63, 241 N. W. 458 (1932);
Shulsky v. Shulsky, 98 Kan. 69, 157 P. 407 (1916); Daniel v. Tyler, 296 Ky.
808, 178 S. W. 2d 411 (1944); Bemis v. Fletcher, 251 Mass. 178, 146 N. E. 277
(1925); Appeal of Sleeper, 129 Me. 194, 151 Atl. 150 (1930); Re Hull, 164 Md.
39, 163 Atl. 819 (1933); Re Dimmitt Estate, 141 Neb. 413, 3 N. W. 2d 752
(1942); Hastings v. Bridge, 86 N. H. 247, 166 Atl. 273 (1933); First-Mechanics
Nat. Bank v. Norris, 134 N. J. Eq. 229, 34 A. 2d 746 (1943); Re Bressler's
Estate, 155 Mich. 567, 119 N. W. 1104 (1909); Watson v. Hinson, 162 N. C. 72,
77 S. E. 1089 (1913); Re Bunting, 30 Ohio Op. 269, 15 Oh. Supp. 54 (Prob.,
1945); Re Hogue's Will, 135 Pa. Super. 543, 6 A. 2d 108 (1939); Richardson v.
Byrd, 166 S. C. 251, 164 S. E. 643 (1932); Lawless v. Lawless, 187 Va. 511, 47
S. E. 2d 431 (1948). See annot., 144 A. L. R. 714 (1943) and 3 A. L. R. 2d
682 (1949) for additional U. S. and English cases.
19 Bottrell v. Spengler, 343 Ill. 476, 175 N. E. 781 (1931); annot., 3 A. L. R.
2d 682 (1949).
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amendable, inter vivos trust is changed subsequent to the execu-
tion of the will without the execution of a complementary codicil
to the will. The first important case on this point was Atwood v.
Rhode Island Hospital Trust Co.,20 where after execution of his
will the testator added four beneficiaries to his living trust and
cancelled a part of the original trust without supplementing his
will with a codicil. It was held that the pour-over of the residue
of the will into the living trust was ineffectual because it abro-
gated the statute of wills. The court displayed absolute adher-
ence to the rigid formalities of complete conformance with the
provisions of the statute of wills.
21
The stringent rule set forth in the Atwood case was soon
thereafter modified in Koeninger v. Toledo Trust Co. 22 and Old
Colony Trust Co. v. Cleveland.23 These cases held that the
amendment to the inter vivos trust after the execution of the will
was wholly inoperative. But, the incorporated trust was given
validity as to the original unamended trust as it existed at the
time of execution of the will. The court, in Old Colony Trust
Co., gave for its reason that
the will .... could not give the residue in trust for purposes
.... (which) remained to be defined by later amendment
of the trust deed.2 4
In Koeninger, a similar reason was offered by the court.
A more recent decision giving effect to incorporation by ref-
erence similarly held that the mere possibility of an amendment
of the trust does not make the will or trust void when the trust
is incorporated in the will by reference.25 But here there were
20 Supra n. 10; which relied on the English case of Johnson v. Ball, supra
n. 5 and Olliffe v. Wells, 130 Mass. 221 (1881). See discussion in McClana-
han, op. cit. supra n. 4, and Palmer, op. cit. supra n. 4.
21 Further discussion on the same will as in the Atwood v. Rhode Island
Hospital Trust Co. may be found in Boal v. Metropolitan Museum of Art,
298 Fed. 894 (2d Cir. 1924). But cf., Merrill v. Atwood, 48 R. I. 72, 135 Atl.
402 (1926).
22 49 Ohio App. 490, 197 N. E. 419 (1934).
23 291 Mass. 380, 196 N. E. 920 (1935); but cf., Second Bank-State St. Trust
Co. v. Pinion, 170 N. E. 2d 350 (Mass. 1960), which upheld the pour over
upon a different rationale.
24 Old Colony Trust Co. v. Cleveland, 291 Mass. 380, 196 N. E. 920 (1935).
25 Re York's Estate, 95 N. H. 435, 65 A. 2d 282 (1949). The case cites
First-Central Trust Co. v. Claflin (C. P.) 49 Ohio L. Abs. 29, 73 N. E. 2d
388 (1947), based upon Ohio Rev. Code Sec. 2107.05 (Page 1954), which
allows the incorporation of an amenable and revocable inter vivos trust
"which is referred to as being in existence at the time the will is executed."
4https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol13/iss3/15
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no amendments subsequent to the execution of the will, although
the incorporated trust had contained amendments prior to the
will.
It appears that the modern weight of authority will not
invalidate a living trust as testamentary merely because the
grantor of the trust reserves a life estate and a power to revoke
and amend. 26
Following the strict construction of the doctrine of Incorpo-
ration by Reference, even the most minor amendment of the
inter vivos trust instrument would not place it in the same con-
dition at the death of the testator as it was when the will was
executed.2 7 The reason for this is that the amended trust instru-
ment was non-existent at the time of execution of the will.28
Since the amended section of the trust instrument was not in
existence at the will's execution, it could therefore not be re-
ferred to as existing. The barriers against incorporating the
amended trust instrument into the will can be rapidly removed
by adherence to the doctrine of independent significance.
Doctrine of Independent Legal Significance
The courts2 9 have considered the doctrine of independent
significance "as a partial escape device from the rigors of the
incorporation by reference rule." 30 The doctrine states that a
living trust stands by itself as a self-sufficient entity and is not
dependent upon the terms of a will to be the recipient of a pour-
over disposition.3 ' "It is not the trust instrument, but the trust
26 National Shawmut Bank v. Joy, 315 Mass. 457, 53 N. E. 2d 113 (1944);
Bolles v. Toledo Trust Co., 144 Ohio St. 195, 58 N. E. 2d 381 (1944); Cramer
v. Hartford-Connecticut Trust Co., 110 Conn. 22, 147 Atl. 139 (1929); Dun-
nett v. Shields, 97 Vt. 419, 123 Atl. 626 (1924); Talbot v. Talbot, 32 R. I. 72,
78 Atl. 535 (1911); Barnes, The Pour-Over Trust in New England, 41 B. U.
L. Rev. 520 (1961).
27 McClanahan, op. cit. supra n. 4.
28 Id. at 273.
29 In re Estate of Evans, 165 Ohio St. 27, 133 N. E. 2d 128 (1956); State
ex rel. Citizens National Bank v. Superior Court, 236 Ind. 135, 138 N. E. 2d
900 (1956); Forsythe v. Spielberger, 86 So. 2d 427 (Fla. 1956); Continental
Ill. National Bank & Trust Co. v. Art Institute, 409 Ill. 481, 100 N. E. 2d 625
(1951); In re York's Estate, 95 N. H. 435, 65 A. 2d 282 (1949); Wells Fargo
Bank & Union Trust Co. v. Superior Court, 32 Cal. 2d 1, 193 P. 2d 721(1948); Estate of Tower, 115 N. Y. L. J. 1889, Col. 7 (Surr. Ct. 1946); Swet-
land v. Swetland, 102 N. J. Eq. 294, 140 Atl. 279 (1928); Atwood v. Rhode
Island Hospital Trust Co., 275 Fed. 513 (1st Cir. 1921) (dissent). See Heyert
and Rachlin, op. cit. supra n. 3.
80 Atkinson, Wills § 81 at 397 (2d ed. 1953).
81 1 Scott, Trusts § 54.3 (2d ed. 1956).
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itself, which has independent significance." 32 This doctrine per-
mits a greater degree of flexibility in utilization of the pour-over
provision than incorporation by reference, for this doctrine ap-
plies to amendments to the inter vivos trust after execution of
the will as well as before.8 3 The subsequent amendment is effec-
tive because it is based upon the equitable doctrine that subse-
quent acts of independent significance do not require attestation
under the statute of wills. 3 4 Since the property added to the liv-
ing trust is affected, the amendment has significance apart from
the testamentary disposition.
3 5
The doctrine of independent significance's basic proposition
is that the missing identity of the beneficiary or estate asset is
supplied by using extrinsic evidence of the specified act or place
mentioned in the will as the means of identification. 6 There are
a variety of circumstances in which it comes into play. Where
property in a certain house, room or receptacle was be-
queathed; 37 or bequests to employees of the testator at the time
of his death;38 or even to persons caring for the testatrix at her
death3 9 are vivid illustrations of the manner in which this doc-
trine works.
40
The earliest decision bearing on independent significance
was rendered by Chief Justice Cardozo In the Matter of
Rausch.41 The testator had bequeathed one-fifth of his residuary
estate to a previously created unamendable and irrevocable
32 Id. at 367. Prof. Scott continues by stating: "Even though a disposition
cannot be fully ascertained from the terms of a will, it is not invalid if it
can be ascertained from their effect upon the disposition in the will."
33 Evans, Nontestamentary Acts and Incorporation by Reference, 16 U. Chi.
L. Rev. 635 (1949); Heyert and Rachlin, op. cit. supra n. 3 at 1110.
34 See Second Bank-State St. Trust Co. v. Pinion, supra n. 23.
85 1 Scott, op. cit. supra n. 30 at 377.
36 McClanahan, op. cit. supra n. 20 at 278.
87 Buchwald v. Buchwald, 175 Md. 103, 199 Atl. 795 (1938); Gaff v. Corn-
wallis, 219 Mass. 226, 106 N. E. 860 (1914); Creamer v. Harris, 90 Ohio St.
160, 106 N. E. 967 (1914); Parrot v. Avery, 159 Mass. 594, 35 N. E. 94 (1893).
See Atkinson, op. cit. supra n. 30 at 394.
88 Metcalf v. Sweeney, 17 R. I. 213, 21 Atl. 364 (1891); In re Hirshorn's
Estate, 120 Colo. 294, 209 P. 2d 543 (1949). See Atkinson, op. cit. supra n. 30.
89 Dennis v. Holsapple, 148 Ind. 297, 47 N. E. 631 (1897); Hastings v. Bridge,
86 N. H. 247, 166 AtI. 273 (1933). See Atkinson, op. cit. supra n. 30.
40 See supplementary examples in Comment, 46 Mich. L. Rev. 77 at 79
(1947).
41 258 N. Y. 327, 179 N. E. 755, 80 A. L. R. 98 (1932); Note, 21 Cornell L. Q.
492 (1936); Note, 32 Col. L. Rev. 917 (1932) Note 6 U. Cinc. L. Rev. 295
(1932).
6https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol13/iss3/15
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inter vivos trust, and had manifested an intent to include it
within his will. Cardozo held the bequest valid even though New
York does not recognize incorporation by reference. 42 He sug-
gested that the testamentary disposition to the trustee was anal-
ogous to "a gift to a corporation for the uses stated in its char-
ter," 43 with the terms of the trust used as evidence in identifying
the distributee.
A similar analogy as that used by Cardozo in the Rausch
decision was effectively used in a New Jersey case, 44 in which
a pour-over bequest from the will to a revocable living trust
was held valid through utilization of independent significance.
The court held that the trust was in factual existence and stood
independent from any bequests in the will.
45
It was not until President and Directors of Manhattan Co.
v. Janowitz46 that an important decision was rendered which
refused to utilize facts of independent significance to validate
an unattested amendment to an inter vivos trust which was
made after the execution of a will with a pour-over provision.
The testator had created a modifiable and revocable inter vivos
trust previous to the execution of a will containing a pour-over
provision. Subsequent to the time of the will's execution, he
amended the trust by changing one of its beneficiaries without
executing a codicil. The court held not only that the subsequent
amendment failed but that the entire trust failed. It distin-
guished the case from the Rausch decision on several grounds:
(1) the trust was amendable and revocable; (2) the trust inden-
ture was in fact modified subsequent to the will's execution; and
(3) the settlor reserved the right to alter and revoke the trust
indenture.47 The court went on to say that:
42 Matter of Fowles' Will, 222 N. Y. 222, 118 N. E. 611 (1918); see discussion
in Evans, op. cit. supra n. 33, and Palmer, Testamentary Dispositions to the
Trustee of an Intervivos Trust, 50 Mich. L. Rev. 33 at 55-58 (1951).
43 In The Matter of Rausch, 258 N. Y. at 331, 179 N. E. at 758.
44 Swetland v. Swetland, 102 N. J. Eq. 294, 140 Atl. 279 (1928); Note, 37 Yale
L. J. 1002 (1928).
45 See Fifth-Third Union Trust Co. v. Wilensky, 79 Ohio App. 73, 70 N. E.
2d 920 (1946), wherein an Ohio Court of Appeals held that where a rev-
ocable inter vivos trust was incorporated in the will, and since the at-
tempted revocation of the trust was not executed in conformity with the
formalities of the statute of wills, the attempted revocation failed.
46 260 App. Div. 174, 21 N. Y. S. 2d 232 (1940); see discussion in Scott, The
Law of Trusts 1941-1945, 59 Harv. L. Rev. 157 at 167; Palmer, supra n. 40 at
53.
47 See Annot., 8 A. L. R. 2d 614, 616 (1949).
Sept., 1964
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The reservation of power to amend the trust indenture and
its repeated exercise eliminated all independent significance
that might be attached to the trust indenture.
48
The first inroad in validating a pour-over disposition to an
amended living trust was made In Matter of Ivie.49 The court
held that a bequest of stock to a pre-existing, inter vivos, char-
itable trust was valid, even though the trust was amended sub-
sequent to the execution of the will. It should be mentioned that
the amendment eliminated the testator's power to modify and
revoke the trust, and thus the net effect left the trust in sub-
stantially the same form as when it was originally executed.50
Although the modification to the trust was negligible, the deci-
sion laid a foundation for increased and varied uses of the pour-
over. No longer was a pour-over provision restricted to an ir-
revocable and unamendable living trust, or one which had not
been amended subsequent to the execution of the will.
Finally, the Massachusetts case of Second Bank-State Street
Trust Co. v. Pinion5 1 was the first decision to unequivocally hold,
without the aid of a statute, that a pour-over provision could be
conveyed under the terms of an unattested instrument amending
a living trust and drafted subsequent to the execution of the will.
The court based its holding on the equitable doctrine that sub-
sequent acts of independent significance do not require attesta-
tion under the statute of wills, 52 and thereby repudiated any re-
liance on incorporation by reference.53 The result is diametrical-
ly opposite to that found in the earlier Massachusetts decision of
48 260 App. Div. at 179, 21 N. Y. S. 2d at 237.
49 4 N. Y. 2d 178, 149 N. E. 2d 725 (1958); see discussion in 45 Cornell L. Q.
135 (1959); Scott, Pouring Over, 97 Trusts & Estates 189 (1958); Comment,
57 Mich. L. Rev. 81 at 87 (1958).
50 The court stated in 4 N. Y. 2d 178 at 181, 149 N. E. 2d at 726, (that)
"where the trust itself remains unimpaired and substantially the same as it
was at the time of execution of the will, and certainly where the amend-
ments are concerned solely with the administrative provisions of the trust
deed, it cannot be said to come within the purview of the rule against in-
corporation by reference." Also see Note, The Desirability of Pour Over
Legislation, 44 Minn. L. Rev. 131, 137 (1959).
51 170 N. E. 2d 350 (Mass. 1960); Note, 59 Mich. L. Rev. 1276 (1961).
52 See Restatement (Second), Trusts Sec. 54 comment i (1959).
53 The court stated in 170 N. E. 2d at 352 "The doctrine of incorporation by
reference, even if applicable at all where an intent to incorporate in the
usual sense is negatived .... could not import the nonexistent amendment."
8https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol13/iss3/15
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Old Colony Trust Co. v. Cleveland,54 which was referred as be-
ing "inconsistent with present legal thought." 55 The reliance on
independent significance was the rationale upon which the court
validated the subsequent amendment.5 6
The Pinion decision was soon backed up by Canal National
Bank v. Chapman,5 7 which also sustained the validity of an un-
attested amendment based on independent significance. The
court reasoned that the testatrix's manifested intent was not to
create a testamentary trust, but to add property to an existing
non-testamentary trust as it existed at the time of her death.58
In light of this intent, the court found no solid ground for not
giving validity to the amended trust in view of the fact that the
trust was in existence and referred to in the will.59
The preceding cases present a lucid illustration of the diffi-
culties encountered when the amended trust instrument was
non-existent at the time of the execution of a will with a pour-
over provision. There are three possible alternatives in resolving
the conflict as presented in the prior cases: (1) recognition of
the validity of the trust amendment; or (2) sustaining the valid-
ity of the trust in its original terms at the time of execution of
the will; or (3) defeating the testamentary disposition to the
trust in total.6° The soundest and most favored proposition is the
first, which can be accomplished by reliance on facts of inde-
pendent significance.6 1 By upholding the amendment, the court
54 Supra n. 23, wherein the case held that the will could not give the resi-
due of the estate for purposes which remained to be defined by later amend-
ment of the trust indenture.
55 Second Bank-State Street Trust Company v. Pinion, 170 N. E. 2d at 352.
56 But see Barnes, The Pour-Over Trust in New England, 41 B. U. L. Rev.
520, 526 (1961), wherein he states that even with facts of independent sig-
nificance, the Pinion case would not sustain an amendment to a $5 trust
corpus where the testator attempted to pour-over $100,000, for such amend-
ment is clearly testamentary.
57 157 Me. 309, 171 A. 2d 919 (1961); see Barnes, id. at 531, 532. The case is
the latest one sustaining an unattested trust amendment.
58 The living trust therefore continues to have an active, independent life
of its own.
59 But see Comment, 29 Fordham L. Rev. 143, 149 (1960), wherein it was
stated that based on the assumption that the trust instrument is of inde-
pendent legal significance, the fact that the trust was created before or after
the execution of the will is of little concern as long as it is in existence at
the time of the settlor's death.
60 1 Scott, op. cit. supra n. 31 at 375.
61 It is this alternative upon which the states have relied in legislation giv-
ing effect to the pour-over.
Sept., 1964
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does not frustrate the testator's probable intent that the pour-
over should pass to the trust as it exists at his death. Since the
third alternative appears to have the greatest objection, 62 those
jurisdictions not sustaining the doctrine of independent signifi-
cance follow the second alternative. As one court appropriately
held:
If the testator's intent is to be considered, is it not better to
give substantial effect to the intent, by upholding the will
and the original trust instrument, than to defeat the intent
in toto by holding invalid all of the attempted testamentary
disposition? 63
The abundancy and conflict of litigation in this area can be
primarily attributed to strong public policy behind the statute of
wills.6 4 Recent decisions have mitigated this support. They hold
that the underlying concepts behind the statute of wills, to guard
against fraudulent elements, which may also enter into the mo-
tive for making the trust amendment, is satisfied by the formal
execution of the trust indenture and the solemn transfer of the
trust res to the trustee.6 5
Pour-Over Statutes
Because of the dilatory movement and vagueness of the
courts in substantiating not only the pour-over provision of a
will but an unattested amendment to a pre-existing trust as well,
the states within the past decade have turned to legislative ac-
tion.66 Although the statutes vary by a small degree, 67 they go
62 See President and Directors of Manhattan Co. v. Janowitz, supra n. 44.
63 Stouse v. First National Bank of Chicago, 245 S. W. 2d 914, 920 (Ky. App.
1951), noted in 32 A. L. R. 2d 1261 (1953).
64 A codicil must have been executed to validate an amendment to the trust
which was the receptable of a pour-over provision.
65 See Second Bank-State Street Trust Co. v. Pinion, supra n. 48; and Canal
National Bank v. Chapman, supra n. 57.
66 The following statutes comprise a complete list of legislation dealing with
the pour-over problem: Ala. Code tit. 61, § 4(1) (Supp. 1961). Ariz. Rev.
Stat. Ann. § 14-141 (Supp. 1961). Ark. Stat. Ann. § 60-601 (Supp. 1963).
Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 152-5-45 (1959). Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 45-173
(Supp. 1961). Del. Code Ann. tit. 12, § 111 (Supp. 1957). Fla. Stat. Ann.
§ 736.17 (1963). Ida. Code Ann. § 68-1101 (Supp. 1963). Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 3,
§ 43(a) (Supp. 1961). Ind. Stat. Ann. § 6-601(j) (Burns 1953). Iowa Probate
Code § 633.275 (Supp. 1963). Me. Rev. Stat. ch. 169 § 17-A (Supp. 1963). Md.
Ann. Code art. 93, §§ 350A, 350B (Supp. 1959). Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 203,§ 3B (Supp. 1963). Mich. Stat. Ann. § 26.78(1) (Supp. 1963). Minn. Stat.
Ann. § 525.223 (Supp. 1963). Miss. Code Ann. § 661.5 (Supp. 1962). Mont.
Rev. Code Ann. § 91-321 (Supp. 1963). Neb. Rev. Stat. § 30-1806 (Supp.
1959). N. H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 563-A:1 (Supp 1961). N. J. Stat. Ann. § 3 A:
(Continued on next page)
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to the center of the problem by providing that if a modifiable and
revocable living trust is in existence at the time of executing the
will and is identified therein, subsequent unattested amendments
by the testator to the trust are valid.68 This eliminates the bur-
den of republication or re-execution. The result is that only one
trust has independent significance, that being the inter vivos
trust which obtains plenary control over the disposition of the
trust res.69
Recently, with the trend toward increased state reciprocity,
the Uniform Testamentary Additions to Trusts Act 70 has been
adopted by nearly 50 percent of those states which have passed
(Continued from preceding page)
3-16.1, 16.2 (Supp. 1962). N. C. Gen. Stat. § 31-47 (Supp. 1963). N. D. Cent.
Code § 56-07-01 (Supp. 1961). Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 84, §§ 301-304 (Supp.
1961). Ohio Rev. Code § 2107.63 (Supp. 1963). Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 20, § 180.14
(a) (Supp. 1960). R. I. Gen. Laws Ann. § 33-6-33 (Supp. 1960). S. C. Code
Ann. § 19-296 (Supp. 1961). S. D. Laws ch. 440, p. 495 (1963). Tenn. Code
Ann. § 32-307 (Supp. 1961). Tex. Prob. Code Ann. § 58(a) (Supp. 1961).
Utah Code Ann. § 74-3-23 (Supp. 1961). Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 14, § 2329 (Supp.
1961). Va. Code Ann. § 64-71.1 (Supp. 1960). Wash. Rev. Code § 11.12.250
(1959). W. Va. Code Ann. § 4058(1) (Supp. 1961). Wis. Stat. Ann. § 231.205
(Supp. 1964). Wyo. Comp. Stat. Ann. § 2-53 (Supp. 1957).
67 For detailed analysis of legislation on pour-over dispositions see Mc-
Clanahan, supra n. 4 at 295; Comment, 57 Mich. L. Rev. 89 (1958); Polasky,
"Pour-Over" Wills and the Statutory Blessing, 98 Trusts & Estates 949, 955
(1959).
68 A typical statute may be found in Ohio Rev. Code § 2107.63, wherein it
is provided that "A testator may by will devise, bequeath, or appoint real
or personal property, to a trustee of a trust which is evidenced by a written
instrument executed by the testator or any other person either before or on
the same date of the execution of such will and which is identified in such
will.
The property or interest so devised, bequeathed, or appointed to such
trustee shall be added to and become part of the trust estate, shall be sub-
ject to the jurisdiction of the court having jurisdiction of such trust, and
shall be administered in accordance with the terms and provisions of the
instrument creating such trust, including, unless the will specifically pro-
vides otherwise, any amendments or modifications thereof made in writing
before, concurrently with, or after the making of the will and prior to the
death of the testator. The termination of such trust, or its entire revoca-
tion prior to the testator's death, shall invalidate such devise, bequest, or
appointment to such trust."
Similar statutes may be found in Ala., Fla., Md., R. I., Tex., Utah, Va.,
Wash., and Wyo., supra n. 66 .
A discussion of the manner in which the Ohio statute would alter the
result in Koeninger v. Toledo Trust Co., supra n. 22, may be found in Leg-
islation, Decedents Estates-Independent Legal Significance and Pour-Over
Wills, 13 W. Res. L. Rev. 795, 796 (1962).
The Ohio Act also reverses the decision rendered in Fifth-Union Trust
Co. v. Wilensky, supra n. 45.
69 1 Scott, op. cit. supra n. 31, Re York's Estate, supra n. 25.
70 See supra n. 2; Note, 36 Conn. Bar J. 267 (1962).
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pour-over legislation. 7 The Act provides that pour-over devolu-
tions of property to a pre-existing, amendable and revocable
trust are valid. The trust shall be administered in pursuance of
the trust provisions including all amendments made without tes-
tamentary formality before the testator's death, even though the
amendments are made subsequent to the execution of the will.
If the will so provides, amendments to the trust after the testa-
tor's death shall be valid. 72 Finally, under the Act, any revoca-
tion of the inter vivos trust prior to the testator's death would
render the trust void.
7 3
The utilization of uniform legislation is significant in several
respects. It upholds any testamentary disposition which an un-
informed person may make. For those persons who are pre-
sumed to comprehend the Act and its many involved problems,
there naturally results greater certainty and simplicity in effect-
ing planned dispositions.
74
The vitalization of pour-over provisions by state legislation
based upon the doctrine of independent significance is readily
apparent.
The test (with these statutes) is not whether the facts
are subject to the control of the testator, but whether they
are facts which have significance apart from the disposition
of the property bequeathed. 75
Most of the statutes sagaciously provide that "the terms of the
will shall govern the effect of the amendment." 76 This creates
a new exception to the statute of wills, for as the testator period-
ically changes the terms of the inter vivos trust, he, in effect, is
changing the terms of his will without the requisite testamentary
formality of supplementing it with a codicil.77 Those statutes
supporting amendments to the trust even subsequent to the
71 Those states adopting the Uniform Testamentary Additions to Trust Act
are Ariz., Ark., Conn., Id., Ia., Mass., Me., Mich., Minn., N. H., N. J., N. D.,
Okla., S. C., S. D., Tenn., Vt., W. Va.
72 Of those states not adopting the Act only Fla., Ind., and Pa. have in-
corporated this provision. Its propriety appears questionable. See Polasky,
op. cit. supra n. 67.
73 See 21 A. L. R. 2d 220 (Supp. 1964).
74 See Polasky, op. cit. supra n. 67 at 962.
75 1 Scott, op. cit. supra n. 31 at 376.
76 States not so providing are Conn., Fla., Ore., and Wis. See discussion in
Polasky, op. cit. supra n. 74 at 958.
77 See Note, The Desirability of Pour Over Legislation, 44 Minn. L. Rev.
131 (1959).
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death of the testator 78 carve out a noteworthy exception to one
of the requisites of the doctrine of incorporation by reference,
i.e. that the inter vivos trust be in existence at the time of the
execution of the will.79 They have also devised an innovation to
revocation by allowing a will, or any part thereof, to be revoked
by revocation of an independent, non-testamentary instrument.8 0
The statutes do not appear to be limited in scope as to the
type of trust which could be the receptacle of a pour-over pro-
vision. It may be directed to a private or charitable trust.8 1 The
testamentary disposition may be made to a trust in which the
testator was not the settlor. An estate planner is cognizant of
the beneficial implications to be extracted from this interpreta-
tion, in that, it permits a living trust created by one member of
a family to be incremented by other members of the same fam-
ily.8 2 It therefore appears that the utility to be extracted from
these statutory enactments have many salutary facets.
Conclusion
The estate planner is aware of the fact that the coordination
of the living trust and will is an integral part of a person's estate
plan and therefore an amendment of the trust may serve both
a testamentary and non-testamentary function s. 8  Of the many
useful features of the pour-over device in estate planning, sev-
eral of the more salient ones are as follows: 8 4
78 Supra n. 72.
79 E.g., Lawless v. Lawless, 187 Va. 511, 47 S. E. 2d 431 (1948); supra n. 18.
See also Legislation, 44 Va. L. Rev. 1405, 1406 (1958).
80 E.g., Ohio Rev. Code § 2107.63 supra n. 68. See Bank of Delaware v.
Bank of Delaware, 161 A. 2d 430 (Del. Ch. 1960), which under the Dela-
ware statute, supra n. 66, held where the testatrix's will provided that the
pour-over should be effective only if the trust were in existence at the
time of her demise, in view of an amendment directing that the corpus of
the intervivos trust be paid over to the executor of the testatrix, a revoca-
tion of the trust resulted. Also see Legislation, 44 Va. L. Rev. 1405, 1406
(1958).
Sl But see comment in Indiana statute supra n. 66, wherein the statute is
applicable only to gifts to an existing-Public Charitable Trust.
82 Note, Incorporating Non-Testamentary Documents into a Will, 15 Wyo.
L. J. 58, 60 (1960).
88 Evans, Incorporation by Reference, Integration, and Non-Testamentary
Act, 25 Col. L. Rev. 879 (1925).
84 See Roth, Estate Planning in Florida: The Revocable Inter Vivos Trust,
16 U. Fla. L. Rev. 34 (1963); Note, 59 Mich. L. Rev. 1276 (1961); McClana-
han, Bequests to an Existing Trust-Problems and Suggested Remedies, 47
Calif. L. Rev. 267 (1959); Shattuck & Farr, An Estate Planner's Handbook
§ 13 at 84 (2d ed. 1953).
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1. Unification of administration of trust and probate cor-
pus, in that, management of the trust property will not
be interrupted by the death of the settlor;
2. Minimization of administration expenses;
3. Avoidance of costly court supervision and accounting
procedures required of the testamentary trustee;
4. More flexibility of administration, in that, the consoli-
dated trust and estate corpus leads to greater diversifi-
cation and less risk;
5. Minimization of income, trust, estate and inheritance
taxes;
6. Greater degree of certainty over trust amendments;
7. Grantor of trust is able to determine the competency
and discretion of the trustee who will manage the prop-
erty after the grantor's death;
8. Avoidance of any family publicity attaching to the pro-
bate of the will;
9. Avoidance of ancillary administration of estate assets
located in another jurisdiction;
10. Creditors may find greater difficulty in reaching trust
property than nontrust property;
11. Any heirs who contest the will may find it more difficult
to upset a long established trust than a will.
In light of recent judicial recognition and legislative action
affording the pour-over a new vitality based on independent
significance, the law regarding pour-over dispositions does not
appear to be as uncertain and confused as it had been a decade
ago. Reliance upon statutes should be light until there is judicial
accord in each jurisdiction.
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